Flooring companies are as vulnerable to crime as any other industry. Why they must take proactive steps to protect their positions. Adam Bernstein explores.
SOMETIMES we come across stories that are so outlandish as to be unbelievable – where the brass neck of the criminals is beyond belief. Yet these stories are, remarkably, true.
Consider the theft found at a client by Dave Kearns, managing director of the Expert Investigations Group, of high value flooring worth £90,000 that had been loaded by employees into their vehicles, driven off, and subsequently sold on eBay.
There are other cases: £3,000 worth of laminate flooring stolen in October 2007 during a break-in at a yard of Wood & Laminate Distribution in East Tilbury by thieves who cut through a fence and used a forklift truck to remove four pallets; and £2,500 of flooring stolen in November 2010 from outside a business in Billingham.
Then there was the theft of more than 120kg of vinyl flooring taken from outside a shop in Ramsey on the Isle of Man in July 2020 – along with six van tyres. Police said that the thief would have needed a vehicle to move it.
The theft occurred during Covid-19 lockdown and was only discovered by the owner once they returned after restrictions eased.
Interestingly, the government’s 2023 Commercial Victimisation Survey (CVS), updated in September 2024, found – among things – that an estimated 26% (409,000) of all business premises, in England and Wales, were a victim of a CVS crime during the previous 12 months; and the most prevalent offence type experienced by businesses was theft (14%), followed by burglary (including attempts) (8%).
Risks of loss
Zachariah Islam, managing director of Region Security Guarding, says that loss in commercial and industrial environments is more prevalent than many business owners might assume – ‘while retail settings often focus on shoplifting, industrial and commercial sectors face diverse risks that can lead to significant financial losses’.
Typically, his firm sees crimes relating to external theft which will most commonly involve trespassing and break-ins targeting valuable stock, machinery, and even fuel. He says that ‘it’s not uncommon for organised crime groups to begin targeting businesses if they notice there’s a lack of effective security on-site’.
And then there’s employee-related theft, which will often target the removal of easy-to-conceal company property. Most often, items like tools and electronics.
Kearns sees three different vectors for attack.
The first comes through external players who commit fraud or who perpetrate cyberattacks by, for example, either obtaining monies via false invoicing or supplier frauds.
Next comes external physical theft through burglary, walk in theft, and criminal damage.
Thirdly, Kearns highlights the risk of internal theft and fraud committed by employees.
Losing items
Theft goes beyond the obvious ‘removal’ of the physical as employees can also ‘lose’ items such as phones or laptops. As Kearns outlines, ‘it’s simple for an employee to ‘lose’ something… steal it and report it as a loss and sell it – especially as there are many routes for sale for stolen products’.
Islam thinks the same. He too says it’s surprisingly easy for employees to ‘lose’ company property, and it may not always be accidental: ‘In workplaces with weaker security measures, items like laptops, phones, tools, or even sensitive documents, are at risk of disappearing without a trace.’
However, they’re certainly not the only thing that will get stolen.
Islam points here to personal protective equipment as another potential target that non-retail commercial environments should be wary of; it’s not uncommon for workers or thieves to take them for their own personal use, or for resale purposes.
Then there’s fuel which he considers probably one of the larger ‘non-conventional’ targets of theft though.
As he outlines, ‘if company vehicles are left unattended, it’s a perfect window for thieves – or even employees – to siphon fuel’.
Islam also thinks low-value items are at high risk of loss and are surprisingly common targets because ‘low-value items often go unnoticed when missing, which makes them an easy target.’
Inventory loss
And what about losses of inventory in general? In relation to this Kearns is bothered so few businesses put internal theft and fraud on the board’s agenda. As he says, ‘it’s only after a theft or fraud that they are willing to accept the risk as real and put measures in place to prevent it happening again’.
Indeed, Islam sees losses of inventory, particularly consumables that are easy to resell, as being more widespread than many business owners realise or are willing to admit. As he comments, ‘unlike high-value items that require tracking, small consumables – such as stock-in-trade materials, office supplies, or raw goods – can disappear unnoticed over time.’
But why don’t directors see theft as a risk to their business? It’s very odd for, as Kearns says, ‘there are simple, cost effective measures they can introduce to prevent, disrupt or detect such crimes.’
A typical criminal?
With a hint of caution, Kearns says that risk is ever present and so ‘there are no generic telltale signs; people being dishonest generally do not attract attention to themselves.’
While there have been documented and proven ‘red flag’ indicators such as excessive control, a person not taking holidays, aggressive and socially disruptive behaviour, the problem is that the world has changed with virtual and hybrid working – especially as work can be subcontracted out – which makes it harder to see those indicators.
Islam reckons the risk of an insider working with someone outside the company is ‘one of the biggest and most difficult-to-detect security threats in commercial and industrial environments. Employees with access to sensitive information, valuable inventory, or restricted areas can significantly increase the impact of external theft or fraud’.
He’s seen cases where warehouse employees have coordinated with external thieves to leave access points unsecured; staff with knowledge of security systems have disabled alarms or CCTV at key moments; logistics workers have tipped off criminals about high-value shipments or weak security protocols; and office staff with financial access have leaked company banking details or conducted invoice fraud.
The key to protection
Crime prevention measures such as technology, zero-tolerance attitudes, written policies and inventory tracking are, in Kearns’ opinion, ‘the most neglected area by businesses, managers and directors’.
He reckons that situational crime prevention should include IT and software systems, CCTV, access control, inventory and stock monitoring, perimeter security, lighting, housekeeping as well as a written managed protocol that is disseminated to all employees.’ Such measures form layers of protection.
This is a tack that Islam would take.
He too advocates a multi-layered approach that combines physical security measures, technology, strict policies, and a strong security culture. As he says, ‘businesses that rely solely on one aspect, say, just CCTV, often find that gaps still exist. The most effective strategies involve a mix of security measures and employee accountability’.
If advising, he would deploy measures such as CCTV and remote monitoring for sensitive and key areas and recording evidence; access control and key cards to restrict movement; sign-in/sign-out systems to log items movement and reduce unauthorised removals; regular stock audits – both scheduled and surprise; and close monitoring of high-risk items.
But even with such measures Kearns reminds, though, that ‘dishonest employees can override measures put in place or the measures themselves may not be sufficient. Therefore, the question is ‘how effective are these measures?’
He worries ‘firms believe that once they have these measures in place that they are secure. They are not. Every time I conduct a security review, I find that CCTV is ineffective – cameras are faulty or lighting is insufficient, or access controls doors have been jammed open’.
Summary
Crime happens – it’s regrettable. This means firms need to consider themselves under potential attack and so must take proactive steps to protect their positions. To assume ‘it’ll not happen to us’ is to be naïve and negligent.
Adam Bernstein is an independent columnist
